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Abstract 
Immigration restrictions imposed by national governments are arguably the factor most responsible 
for the European Refugee Crisis (ERC). As immigration policies do not fall under the remit of European 
Union sovereignty, the union’s democratic nations are free to operate their own regimes. Although the 
primary drivers of national immigration policies have been identified as both economic and cultural 
in nature, empirical evidence suggests that the latter is of greater significance. Given that the perceived 
fear of value incompatibilities forms the basis of all cultural arguments against immigration, it was 
necessary to investigate the accuracy of perceptions of Muslim Asylum Seeker Values (MASV) by 
administering surveys in two countries at the opposite end of the immigration policy spectrum: 
Hungary and the Netherlands. Hungarians significantly overestimated MASV extremity while Dutch 
people underestimated them. Moreover, the results indicated that perceptions of MASV extremity 
correlate with immigration policy preferences. 
Keywords: Europe, Refugee Crisis, Immigration Policy, Xenophobia, Perceptions of Muslim 
Refugees 
Introduction  
The European Refugee Crisis (ERC) has emerged as an indirect result of the Syrian war 
and general conflict in the Middle East that has put the lives of civilians in that region 
in serious danger. Although there is no disputing that this very source of the ERC needs 
to be attended to through the development of a sustainable geopolitical strategy, such 
efforts cannot come at the expense of the immediate lives of those that have been forced 
to leave that region to protect themselves and their families. The term, ‘crisis’ refers to 
both the situation of the refugees and to the response of the Europeans. Indeed, we can 
identify the direct cause of the ERC in the immigration limitations imposed by 
European host countries. If Europe simply allowed every asylum seeker to settle in its 
territory the ERC wouldn’t be a ‘crisis.’ Although such a scenario is completely 
unrealistic, understanding the premise may enable us to establish an effective 
departure point for a sustainable solution. In the current situation, the majority of EU 
countries exist at the opposite end of the policy spectrum, operating restrictive and ad 
hoc immigration regimes.1 
																																																								
1 Bjerre, L, Helbling, M., Römer, F., Zobel, M. (2016) ‘The Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) Dataset: 
Technical Report, Berlin Social Science Center 
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As immigration policy remains a national competence within the EU, the decision as 
to how many Muslim Asylum Seekers (MAS) are permitted to settle in a given country 
is made by that country alone. Moreover, because strict democratic electoral 
procedures are a requirement for EU accession, it can be deduced that the public’s 
perception of foreigners in a given country of the EU plays a major role in determining 
that nation’s immigration policy. Studies have demonstrated that locals are most 
concerned with the values held by foreigners settling or attempting to settle in their 
country. 2 As MAS constitute a considerable proportion of foreigners in the public’s 
eye, 3 I hypothesise that European perceptions of the values held by MAS (MASV) will 
correlate with immigration policy preferences. Ultimately, this paper seeks to achieve 
three objectives, namely to: 
1. assess how important European perceptions of MASV are in determining 
national immigration policy.  
2. measure how inaccurate these perceptions are.  
3. identify potential causes of this inaccuracy.  
Several prominent theories suggest explanatory models for immigration policy 
influences through both economic and cultural factors. These will be explored in the 
next section of the paper. Moreover, much has been said about the rise of right-wing 
nationalism throughout Europe in recent times, and how the media has played an 
important role in the ascension of these parties. Section three will review the literature 
on both of those topics. In the conclusion to this section I aim to have ascertained what 
one can reliably conclude regarding the main determinants of attitudes toward 
immigration. Considering the scarce literature available on the ways in which 
Europeans perceive MASV and the accuracy of these perceptions, I will field a values 
survey in The Netherlands and Hungary to test my hypothesis. The methodology will 
be outlined in section four and the results will be presented. The final section of the 
paper will discuss these results and provide recommendations for future research in 
the field of immigration attitudes.  
Funding restrictions limited this study to two countries, and the selection was based 
on the desire to represent two countries existing at opposite ends of the immigration 
policy spectrum.  
	  
																																																								
2 Sides, J., Citrin, J. (2007) ‘European Opinion About Immigration: The Role of Identities, Interests and 
Information,’ British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 37, Issue 3, pp. 477-504; Lucassen, G., Lubbers, M. (2012) 
‘Who Fears What? Explaining Far-Right-Wing Preference in Europe by Distinguishing Perceived Cultural and 
Economic Ethnic Threats,’ Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 45, Issue 5; Sniderman, P., Hagendoorn, L. (2007) 
When Ways of Life Collide: Multiculturalism and Its Discontents in the Netherlands. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press; Markaki, Y., Longhi, S. (2013) ‘What determines attitudes to immigration in European 
countries? An analysis at the regional level,’ Migration Studies, Vol. 1, Issue 3. 
3 Ipsos MORI (2016) ‘Perceptions are not reality: what the world gets wrong,’ Ipsos MORI: Game Changers, 







Immigrant policy literature has grown considerably since the outbreak of the ERC. A 
range of theories and conclusions have been used to explain the origins of intercultural 
fears and anti immigration sentiments. These models can be divided into two 
categories: economic and non-economic arguments.  
i. Economic arguments 
Fundamentally, arguments grounded in economics hold that immigration policy 
preferences are largely dependent upon the strength of the national economy. 
Accordingly, whenever an economy is prospering, immigration is likely to be 
supported, and conversely during a tangible contraction phase will be denounced. 
Within this category there are two prominent theories; labour market competition 
theory (LMCT) and fiscal burden theory (FBT). Commencing with the former, Scheve 
and Slaughter affirmed that lower-skilled workers in the US were far more likely to 
resent immigration because the vast majority of migrants would have professional and 
educational profiles similar to their own and consequently represent a threat to the 
former’s employment. 4 Likewise, Borjas et al designed a factor proportions analysis, 
which views immigrants as an addition to the labour supply of a given sector, rendering 
them unpopular with natives whenever that supply becomes unsupportable.5 Mayda 
echoes this sentiment, demonstrating in a cross-national study that attitudes toward 
an influx of immigrants are contingent upon the average difference in skill level 
between both natives and immigrants.6 Another study concluded that immigration 
preferences were contingent upon the level of growth within one’s sector of 
employment.7 Survey data from multiple European countries between 2002 and 2009 
indicated that local workers were indifferent to immigration whenever their economic 
sector was expanding, however when growth stalled and the sector declined, the level 
of support significantly diminished.  
As is the case with LMCT, there are various accounts of the FBT. Hanson claims that 
although most American citizens are aware of the long term economic benefits 
associated with immigration, they realise the public budget is limited.8 Another study 
showed that the distribution of public finances correlated with attitudes towards 
immigrants and not with national trade policy, as is often argued.9 It was suggested 
that this might be why the US immigration policy was a lot more liberal at the start of 
the twentieth century, as welfare spending was virtually non-existent.10 Facchini and 
Mayda offered a more nuanced explanation of FBT, 
																																																								
4 Scheve, K., Slaughter, M. (2001) ‘Labour Market Competition and Individual Preferences Over Immigration 
Policy,’ The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 83, Issue 1.  
5 Borjas, G., Freeman, R., Katz, L. (1996) ‘Searching for the Effect of Immigration on the Labor Market,’ NBER 
Working Paper No. 5454, NBER Program.  
6 Mayda, A.M. (2006) ‘Who is against immigration? A cross-country investigation of individual attitudes toward 
immigrants,’ Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 88, Issue 3.  
7 Dancygier, R., Donnelly, M.J. (2012) ‘Sectoral Economies, Economic Contexts, and attitudes toward 
Immigration,’ The Journal of Politics, Vol 75, Issue 1, pp. 17-35 
8 Hanson, G. (2005) Why Does Immigration Divide America? Washington, DC: Institute for International 
Economics.  
9 Hanson, G., Scheve, K., Slaughter, M. (2007) ‘Public Finance and Individual Preferences over Globalisation 
Strategies.’ Economics and Politics, Vol. 19, Issue 1, pp. 1-33. 
10 Ibid. 
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high income individuals are worse hit by unskilled immigration only if taxes are 
raised to maintain per capita transfers… agents at the bottom of the income 
distribution will suffer more with unskilled immigration if tax rates are kept 
constant and the adjustment is carried out through a reduction in the per capita 
transfers. These relationships are reversed in the case of skilled migration.11  
Hainmueller and Hiscox set up several experiments to test whether either the LMCT 
or FBT could be supported by empirical evidence. 12 Their findings were ‘at odds with 
the claim that concerns about labour market competition are a driving force in shaping 
attitudes toward immigration’.13 On the contrary, they demonstrated the statistical link 
between education levels and immigration preferences. On the whole, natives 
preferred high skilled immigrants to low skilled immigrants. In testing the FBT, the 
authors discovered that, ‘in high-fiscal exposure states the premium attached to 
highly skilled immigration relative to low skilled immigration is decreasing in 
respondents’ income level.’ 14 
This would appear to refute a basic premise of the FBT. Likewise, Markaki and Longhi 
were able to prove that lower qualifications among both natives and immigrants were 
associated with lower perceptions of economic threat from immigration.15 Although 
previous studies were able to find a positive correlation between economic variables 
and immigration preferences through different experimental methods, 16  there are 
enough findings to cast suspicions on the validity of LMCT and FBT in predicting 
attitudes to immigration (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2010; Lucassen & Lubbers, 2011; 
Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007; Muddle, 2007; Markaki & Longhi, 2013).17 
ii. Non-economic arguments 
While global immigration levels have been on the rise since the end of the Second 
World War, every country has had its own unique set of experiences with immigrants 
from different cultures. Several social theorists have attempted to explain why a 
diverse spectrum of multicultural attitudes has emerged.  
Since the mid 1950s, scholars have theorised and attempted to prove that increased 
contact with foreign cultures correlates with diminished intergroup conflict. Gordon 
Allport was the father of what is known as Intergroup Contact theory, which has been 
the foundation of countless social reconciliation policies throughout the world.18 The 
																																																								
11 Facchini, G., Mayda, A. (2009) ‘Does the Welfares State Affect Individual Attitudes toward Immigrants? 
Evidence across Countries.’ Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 91, Issue 2, p. 312 
12 Hainmueller, J., Hiscox, M. (2010) ‘Attitudes toward Highly Skilled and Low-skilled Immigration: Evidence 
from a Survey Experiment,’ American Political Science Review, Vol. 104, Issue 1  
13 Ibid, p. 68 
14 Ibid, p. 81 
15 Markaki, Y., Longhi, S. ‘What determines attitudes to immigration in European countries? An analysis at the 
regional level.’ 
16 Scheve & Slaughter, ‘Labour Market Competition and Individual Preferences Over Immigration Policy’; Mayda, 
‘Who is against immigration? A cross-country investigation of individual attitudes toward immigrants’; Facchini, 
G., Mayda, A. (2009) ‘Does the Welfares State Affect Individual Attitudes toward Immigrants? Evidence across 
Countries.’ Review of Economics and Statistics Vol. 91, Issue 2, pp. 295-314 
17 Hainmueller & Hiscox. ‘Attitudes toward Highly Skilled and Low-skilled Immigration: Evidence from a Survey 
Experiment’; Lucassen & Lubbers, ‘Who Fears What? Explaining Far-Right-Wing Preference in Europe by 
Distinguishing Perceived Cultural and Economic Ethnic Threats,’; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, When Ways of Life 
Collide: Multiculturalism and Its Discontents in the Netherlands; Muddle, C. (2007) Populist radical right 
parties in Europe. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press; Markaki & Longhi, ‘What determines attitudes to 
immigration in European countries? An analysis at the regional level’ 





author stipulated that four conditions needed to be met in order for intergroup contact 
to generate a positive response regarding immigration attitudes. Those conditions are: 
equal status among immigrants and locals, co-operation between groups, common 
goals and support by social and institutional authorities. However, two large-scale 
analyses have since then demonstrated these conditions merely facilitate proceedings 
and aren’t even necessary for achieving a reduced level of prejudice.19 Self reported 
prejudices are the most common way of proving the theory’s validity, 20  yet other 
studies have demonstrated a positive change in physiological responses 21  and 
subconscious biases.22 Pettigrew argues that the positive effect can be attributed to a 
combination of four processes: learning about the out-group, changing one’s behaviour 
through intermingling, generating affective ties with the out-group, and finally in-
group reappraisal.23  
At the opposite end of the theoretical spectrum lies Ethnic Competition theory, which 
posits that natives will hold antagonistic views of immigrants whenever both groups 
hold similar qualifications and immigration levels increase. Although this would 
appear strikingly similar to LMCT, Scheepers, Gijsberts and Coenders make the 
important distinction between individual and contextual competitive conditions that 
explains the difference between the two theories.24 Individual competitive conditions 
refer exclusively to one’s position in the labour market and are thus the defining factor 
of LMCT. On the other hand, contextual competitive conditions measure the 
relationship between the proportion of non-EU citizens in a given EU population and 
the perceived ethnic threat. Several authors have emphasized the importance of this 
factor in intercultural conflict.25 Other scholars have argued that this effect is more 
pronounced among lower skilled and lower educated groups, which would normally 
suggest that economic conditions were more determinant of anti immigration 
sentiments.26 However, in both of the latter cases data was taken during economic 
crises, which doesn’t allow for an accurate reflection of common individual attitudes.  
																																																								
19 Pettigrew, T., Tropp, L. (2006) ‘A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact theory, Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, Vol. 90, Issue 5; Al Ramiah, A., Hewstone, M., Schmitt, K. (2011) Intergroup difference and 
harmony: The role of intergroup contact. In Singh, P., Bain, P., Leong, C., Misra, G., Ohtsubo, Y. (Eds.), 
Individual, group and cultural processes in changing societies. Progress in Asian Social Psychology (Series 8), pp. 
3-22. Delhi: University Press. 
20 Vonofakou, C., Hewstone, M., Voci, A. (2007) ‘Contact with outgroup friends as a predictor of meta-attitudinal 
strength and accessibility of attitudes towards gay men.’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 92, 
pp. 804-820; Caspi, A. (1984) ‘Contact Hypothesis and Inter-Age Attitudes: A Field Study of Cross Age Contact,’ 
Social Psychology Quarterly, Vol. 47, Issue 1 
21 Blascovich, J., Mendes, W., Hunter, S., Lickel, B., Kowai-Bell, N. (2001) ‘Perceiver threat in social interactions 
with stigmatized others,’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 80, pp. 253-267 
22 Aberson, C., Haag, S. (2007) Contact, perspective taking, and anxiety as predictors of stereotype endorsement, 
explicit attitudes, and implicit attitudes. Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, Vol. 10, pp. 179-201.  
23 Pettigrew, T. (1998) ‘Intergroup contact theory,’ Annual review of psychology, Vol. 49, issue 1, pp. 65-85. 
24 Scheepers, P., Gijsberts, M., Coenders, M. (2002) ‘Ethnic exclusionism in European countries. Public opposition 
to civil rights for legal migrants as a response to perceived ethnic threat,’ European Sociological Review Vol. 18, 
pp. 17-34 
25 Schlueter, E., Scheepers, P. (2010) ‘The relationship between outgroup size and anti-outgroup attitudes: A 
theoretical synthesis and empirical test of group threat- and intergroup contact theory,’ Social Science Research 
Vol. 39: pp. 285-95; Schneider, S. (2008) ‘Anti-immigrant attitudes in Europe: Outgroup size and perceived 
ethnic threat,’ European Sociological Review 24: pp. 53-67; Quillian, L. (1995) ‘Prejudice as a response to 
perceived group threat: Population composition and anti-immigrant and racial prejudice in Europe,’ American 
Sociology Review Vol. 60: 586-611; Blalock, H. (1967) Toward a Theory of Minority Group Relations, New York: 
John Wiley & Sons. 
26 Olzak, S. (1994) The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press; 
Van Setten, M., Scheepers, P., Lubbers, M. (2017) ‘Support for restrictive immigration policies in the European 
Union 2002-2013: the impact of economic strain and ethnic threat for vulnerable economic groups, European 
Societies, Vol. 19, Issue 4, pp. 440-465. 
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Neither Intergroup Contact theory, nor Ethnic Competition theory is supported by 
reliable empirical data.  As mentioned earlier, although there was some evidence to 
suggest that economic variables influence immigration policy preferences, these 
results appeared to hinge on the study’s methodology. Moreover, various scholars 
maintain that economic fears were significantly mitigated wherever post-secondary 
education was attained.27 Several studies were able to able to conclude that perceived 
cultural threats were stronger predictors of immigration preferences than are 
perceived economic threats.28 Similarly, Koning demonstrated in an extensive cross-
national study that although concerns of welfare abuse may play a role in anti 
immigration sentiment, it is the ‘political translation’ of those facts that holds greater 
sway.29 Despite not being able to present empirical evidence to support their restrictive 
policies, right wing political parties such as the PVV in the Netherlands will convince a 
considerable portion of the public that they possess the ‘facts’ to substantiate their 
agenda. Moreover, the author argued that persuading the public to tolerate 
immigration policy changes was substantially easier than in other fields of social policy. 
As he put it,  
Few voters will themselves be affected by policy changes aimed at disentitling 
future newcomers to the country… Instead of democratic opposition, a more 
significant obstacle to exclusionary welfare reforms is posed by prohibitions on 
differential treatment flowing from both domestic and international legal 
structures’ 30 
The ease at which this is achieved has enabled populist right wing rhetoric to use false, 
sensationalist claims to influence public opinion about the cultural threat of 
immigration.  
As stated in the introduction, a potentially major obstacle to the consequences of the 
anti-immigration framing in the EU has not been accounted for in the form of 
European legislation. Consequently, politicians of member states have exercised their 
capacities as ‘identity entrepreneurs’ and built their campaigning strategies around 
notions of what their target group represents. 31  Mols and Jetten discovered that 
evoking a deep sense of nostalgia is often the key feature of populist right-wing party 
attempts to shape opinion.32 These groups commonly disperse narratives that extol the 
past and blame the decline of the present on its disconnection from old customs and 
certainties. One study has proven that nostalgic longing for the past is considerably 
																																																								
27 Hainmueller, J., Hiscox, M. (2007) Educated Preferences: Explaining Attitudes toward immigration in Europe. 
International Migration Review, Vol. 30, No. 2; Bilodeau, A., Fadol, N. (2011) ‘The roots of contemporary 
attitudes toward immigration in Australia: contextual and individual-level influences,’ Ethnic and Racial Studies, 
Vol.34, Issue 6; Cavaille, C., Marhsall, J. (2017) ‘Education and Anti-Immigration Attitudes: Evidence from 
Compulsory Schooling Reforms Across Western Europe,’ Harvard University, viewed from 
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/jmarshall/files/education_and_anti-immigration_attitudes_0.pdf 
28 Sides & Citrin, ‘European Opinion About Immigration: The Role of Identities, Interests and Information’; 
Lucassen & Lubbers, ‘Who Fears What? Explaining Far-Right-Wing Preference in Europe by Distinguishing 
Perceived Cultural and Economic Ethnic Threats,’; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, When Ways of Life Collide: 
Multiculturalism and Its Discontents in the Netherlands; Markaki & Longhi, ‘What determines attitudes to 
immigration in European countries? An analysis at the regional level’ 
29 Koning, E. (2013) ‘Selective Solidarity: The politics of immigrants’ social rights in Western welfare states,’ 
(Doctoral dissertation). Kingston, Ontario, Canada: Retrieved from Queen’s University.  
30 Ibid, p270 
31 Reicher, S., Hopkins, N. (2001) Self and Nation, Sage, London, UK.  
32 Mols, F., Jetten, J. (2014) ‘No guts, no glory: How framing the collective past paves the way for anti-immigrant 





more powerful when continuity has been interrupted.33 So if a country such as Hungary 
– that has historically experienced low levels of immigration – were all of a sudden to 
be faced with hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers at their borders, nostalgic 
narratives would be likely to impact a significant proportion of voters.  
Furthermore, empirical data indicates that ethnocentric rhetoric isn’t simply an 
esoteric tool deployed by fringe, right-wing radical parties, but in fact rather regularly 
influences the agenda of centre-right parties, a situation that has consequences for the 
entire political spectrum.34 So if a far-right party is able to frame its anti-immigration 
proposal around a series of pseudo-facts, centre-right agendas will adapt out of the fear 
of losing voters to their more radical contemporaries. Dekker & Scholten demonstrate 
how it only takes a small-scale incident to galvanise the public’s sensibilities toward 
controversial stances on large-scale policy issues.35 The authors discovered that policy 
agendas are often adapted when media framing of isolated cases contests the agenda 
of the incumbent government. Moreover, much of the media has consistently 
portrayed MAS in a negative light across several EU countries and given biased 
accounts of Muslim-led violence in comparison to non-Muslim incidents.36 So if right-
wing populism is able to overplay small-scale events and conjure up nostalgic 
narratives that galvanise anti-immigration attitudes, what do these narratives look 
like?  
The term ‘solidarity’ permeates the literature, and is commonly viewed as the key 
mechanism for engendering a sense of nationhood.37 At a basic level, the concept refers 
to an individual’s sense of belonging to a larger group based on shared qualities or 
characteristics. It is the defining feature of Social Identity theory, which states that an 
individual’s idea of who they are is primarily based on what groups they identify with.38 
Moreover, to enhance their social status, individuals look to positively differentiate 
their own group from other groups in society, creating a contest between in-groups and 
out-groups. Kymlicka argues that the onset of social projects in the post war era lead 
to a ‘progressives dilemma’ where nations believed they had to make a decision 
between solidarity and diversity.39  This arises from the belief that a multicultural 
society suffers from weaker conceptions of solidarity, as outsiders would have legal 
																																																								
33 Iyer, A., Jetten, J. (2011) ‘What’s left behind: Identity continuity moderates the effect of nostalgia on well-being 
and life choices,’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol.101, Issue 1.  
34 Mols, F. (2012) What makes a frame persuasive? Lessons from social identity theory. Evidence & Policy, Vol. 8, 
Issue 3, pp. 329-345. 
35 Dekker, R., Scholten, P. (2017) ‘Framing the Immigration Policy Agenda: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of 
Media Effects on Dutch Immigration Policies,’ The International Journal of Press/Politics, Vol. 22, Issue 2.  
36 Berry, M., Garcia-Blanco, I., Moore, K. (2015) ‘Press coverage of the Refugee and Migrant Crisis in the EU: A 
Content Analysis of Five European Countries,’ Report prepared for the United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees, Cardiff School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies; West, K., Lloyd, J. (2017) ‘The Role of 
Labelling and Bias in the Portrayals of Acts of ‘Terrorism’: Media Representations of Muslims vs Non-Muslims,’ 
Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 37, Issue 2, pp. 211-222; Jacobs, L., Meeusen, C., D’haenens, L. (2016) 
‘News coverage and attitudes on immigration,’ European Journal of Communication, Vol.3, Issue 6, pp. 642-660. 
37 Calhoun, C. (2002) ‘Imagining Solidarity: Cosmopolitanism, Constituional Patriotism, and the Public Sphere.’ 
Public Culture, Volume 14, Issue 1; Sager, A. (2016) ‘Methodological Nationalism, Migration and Political Theory,’ 
Political Studies, Vol. 64, Issue 1; Kymlicka, W. (2015) ‘Solidarity in diverse societies: beyond neoliberal 
multiculturalism and welfare chauvinism. Comparative Migration Studies, Vol. 3, Issue 4, pp. 301-334. 
38 Tajfel, H., Turner, J. (1979) ‘An integrative theory of intergroup conflict’. In W. Austin & S. Worchel. The social 
psychology of intergroup relations. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole. pp. 33-47; Sniderman, P., Hagendoorn, L., Prior, 
M. (2004) ‘Predisposing Factors and Situational Triggers: Exclusionary Reactions to Immigrant Minorites’, The 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 98, No. 1; Huddy, L. (2001) ‘From Social to Political Identity: A Critical 
Examination of Social Identity Theory’, Political Psychology, Vol. 22, Issue 1; Brown, R. (2000) ‘Social Identity 
Theory: Past Achievements, Current Problems and Future Challenges’, European Journal of Social Psychology, 
Vol. 30, Issue 6, pp. 745-778. 
39 Kymlicka, ‘Solidarity in diverse societies: beyond neoliberal multiculturalism and welfare chauvinism’ 
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access to the limited social membership services, fracturing the value-based unity the 
in-group previously enjoyed. The welfare state was conceived as a service for those who 
belonged to that society and not a tool for universal humanitarianism. However, 
multiple studies have proven that diversity and solidarity are not mutually exclusive 
concepts by demonstrating in cross-national studies that attitudes towards 
multiculturalism don’t correlate with social spending. 40 
Finally, conceptions of solidarity need to be viewed from an ideological perspective in 
order to properly comprehend the way public opinion is shaped. Ring-wing populist 
parties construct national identity crisis narratives in order to improve their bargaining 
position in the electoral market.41 Yet while the parties’ leaders perform the role of 
identity entrepreneur, they are also staunch protectors of liberal principles. Several 
scholars assert that the far right claims to resent immigration for the dangers it brings 
to the foundational elements of a liberal society such as gender equality and the 
separation of religion and the state.42 Subsequently, an identity is formed on the basis 
of an identifiable set of common values, which then generates an ‘us versus them’ 
mentality.43 Those who don’t share the set of values held by the majority are considered 
as outsiders who don’t belong to that society and therefore don’t deserve access to its 
welfare system and labour market. This is because they are believed to have consciously 
chosen to identify with a group that is at odds with that society’s core values. Symbolic 
Racism theory would hold that it is these conflicting sets of values that lead to racism.44  
So in summary, while there is some evidence to suggest that economic fears of 
immigration affect individual policy preferences, cultural fears appear to be better 
determinants of the outcome. Several scholars present rational arguments that link 
these cultural apprehensions to the belief that the values held by immigrants are 
incompatible with those espoused in host countries.45 Moreover, as biased accounts of 
small-scale issues from the media and populist politicians appear to stimulate these 
fears, it would be interesting to discover how accurate public perceptions are of the 
values held by the group of immigrants causing the greatest stir in contemporary news. 
Subsequently, this paper will quantitatively measure the accuracy of European 
perceptions of Muslim Asylum Seeker Values (MASV). I hypothesise that both 
Hungarian and Dutch perceptions of MASV will significantly overestimate the 
																																																								
40 Brady, D., Finnigan, R. (2014) ‘Does Immigration Undermine Public Support for Social Policy,’ American 
Sociological Review, Vol. 79, Issue 1; Kesler, C., Bloemraad, I. (2010) ‘Does Immigration Erode Social Capital? 
The Conditional Effects of Immigratio-Generated Diversity on Trust, Membership, and Participation across 19 
Countries, 1981-2000.’ Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 43, Issue 2, pp. 319-47; Banting, K., Kymlicka, 
W. (2006) Multiculturalism and the Welfare Stat: Recognition and Redistribution in Democracies. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
41 Betz, H-G. (1993) ‘The new politics of resentment: Radical right wing populist parties in Western Europe’, 
Comparative Politics, Vol. 25, Issue 4; 41 Swank, D., Betz, H-G. (2003) ‘Globalization, the welfare state and right 
wing populism in Western Europe’, Socio-Economic Review, Vol. 1, pp. 215-245 
42 Akkerman, T. (2005) ‘Anti-Immigration parties and the defence of liberal values: The exceptional case of the 
List Pim Fortuyn,’ Journal of Political Ideologies, Vol. 10, Issue 3; Ponce, A. (2017) ‘Gender and Anti-immigrant 
Attitudes in Europe,’ Socius: Sociological Research in a Dynamic World, Vol. 3, pp. 1-17; Joppke, C. (2010) 
Citizenship and Immigration. Oxford: Polity; Tebble, A. (2006) ‘Exclusion for democracy,’ Political Theory, Vol. 
34, Issue 4, pp. 463-87 
43 Schmitt, C. (1996) The Concept of the Political. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
44 Kinder, D., Sears, D. (1981) ‘Prejudice and politics: Symbolic racism versus racial threats to the good life,’ 
Personality and Social Psychology Review, Vol. 10, pp336-353; McConahay, J. (1982) ‘Self-interest versus racial 
attitudes as correlates of anti-busing attitudes in Louisville: Is it the buses or the blacks?’ Personality and Social 
Psychology Review, Vol. 10, pp. 336-353. 
45 Akkerman, ‘Anti-Immigration parties and the defence of liberal values: The exceptional case of the List Pim 
Fortuyn’; Ponce, ‘Gender and Anti-immigrant Attitudes in Europe’; Joppke, C. (2010) Citizenship and 





extremity of MASV due to the negative bias in the media’s portrayal of MAS. 46 
Additionally, I expect to see a correlation between perceptions of MASV extremity and 
several immigration preference variables. Finally, I anticipate discovering that low 
education levels will be a major cause of these inaccurately held perceptions.  
Methodology 
In order to assess the accuracy of these perceptions a common reference point needed 
to be established. Accordingly, a basket of progressive values (BPV) was created, 
containing seven potentially polarising issues and principles. The selection of these 
issues attempted to cover a mix of progressive principles that the majority of European 
societies support with violence based fears. Participants from the Netherlands (N=260 
and Hungary (N=252) were required indicate on a slider graph what percentage of 
MAS they thought would agree with the following statements: 
1. A woman must always obey her husband. 
2. Homosexuality is morally acceptable. 
3. Abortion should be made illegal. 
4. People should be free to choose their religion and practice it freely. 
5. One can justify killing a family member if they have committed adultery or 
had non-marital sex. 
6. Attacks on civilians are justifiable if they are in defence of Islam. 
7. Authoritarian governments are better than democratic ones in times of 
difficulty. 
Mean results would be calculated and mapped on a graph of perceived extremity of 
MASV. These would then be compared with Real MASV data obtained from the Pew 
Research Center.47 Given that this would require a mean score to be calculated from 
six MAS sender countries, one would have to account for population size. 
Subsequently, Real MASV scores were calculated through the application of the 
following formula:  
(C1P/TAS x C1meanvalue)+ (C2P/TAS x C2meanvalue)+ (C3P/TAS x C3mean) etc 
>>> C5 or C6 depending on the amount of countries with available data on each issue.  
Where: 
-C1P indicates the Asylum Seeker population in Europe of country number 1 in this 
study 
-TAS refers to the combined Total Asylum Seeker population in Europe of all five or 
six MAS countries (depending on available data) 
																																																								
46 West & Lloyd, ‘The Role of Labelling and Bias in the Portrayals of Acts of ‘Terrorism’: Media Representations of 
Muslims vs Non-Muslims’; Berry, Garcia-Blanco, & Moore, ‘Press coverage of the Refugee and Migrant Crisis in 
the EU: A Content Analysis of Five European Countries’; Jacobs, Meeusen & D’haenens, ‘News coverage and 
attitudes on immigration’ 
47 Connor, P. (2016) “Number of Refugees to Europe surges to record 1.3 Million in 2015,” Pew Research Center – 
Global Attitudes and Trends; Hackett, C. (2016) “5 Facts about the Muslim Population in Europe,” Pew Research 
Center- Fact Tank; Bell, J., Lugo, L. (2013) ‘The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society’, Pew Research 
Center 
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-C1meanvalue refers to the mean score obtained for country number 1 in response to 
the value under question.  
C2P, C3P, C4P, C5P and C6P correspond with the other countries in the study, as do 
C2meanvalue, C3meanvalue etc.  
Wherever MASV data is displayed on a graph with a scale that exceeds 100, total MASV 
or MASV perception scores were calculated by simply adding the results from each BPV 
question. As these are based on MASV extremity levels or perceptions thereof, inverse 
results were obtained for questions two and four given that they were positively 
formulated.  
Participants were also asked what they thought their country’s non-Muslim citizens 
views were on the exact same questions, with the wording of question six changing 
from ‘Islam’ to ‘one’s religion.’ This was done in order to gain further understanding of 
the perceived level of compatibility between value sets.  Furthermore, participants 
were required to state what their personal views were on all BPV issues.  
Despite only fielding surveys in two European countries, I believe that one will be able 
to make a number of reasonable assumptions about the perceptions of MASV among 
other EU countries through an analysis of the survey’s comparative variable data. This 
data will be obtained from individual responses to five questions pertaining to 
immigration preferences. Participants would provide this information prior to filling 
in the BPV sliders. The questions are (answer stems in brackets): 
1. How important is the adoption of Dutch/Hungarian customs and traditions to 
becoming truly Dutch/Hungarian? (Very important, somewhat important, not 
really important, not important at all). 
2. Growing diversity makes our country a better place to live? (Strongly agree, 
agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree) 
3. Muslim Asylum Seekers want to adopt the Dutch/Hungarian way of life? 
(Strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree) 
4. Indicate with which statement you agree most. (There are too many Muslims in 
NL/HUN, there is about the right amount of Muslims in NL/HUN, there aren’t 
enough Muslims in NL/HUN, it doesn’t matter how many Muslims there are in 
NL/HUN) 
5. We should allow more Muslim Asylum Seekers to settle in our country. 
(Strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree).  
As stated in my second hypothesis, I believe there will be a strong correlation 
(pearson’s r > 0.15) between these five comparative variables and perceptions of mean 
MASV extremity. Should this be the case then one will be able to make reasonable 
predictions about MASV perceptions in other European countries based on the 
comparable variable data.  
Results 
This section of the paper will present the public opinion data received from the surveys 
run in both Hungary and the Netherlands in order to test the study’s hypotheses and 
address its central question. Relationships between several different variables will be 
compared to allow one to see whether certain correlations emerge, which could 





Table 1- Hungarian perceptions of MASV 
Statement.  Mean SD Median Trimmed 
A woman must always obey her husband. 73.74  30.25 87.5 78.55 
Homosexuality is morally acceptable. 27.27 30.59 12 22.23 
People should be free to choose their religion 
and practice it freely. 
51.26 36.01 50 51.45 
One can justify killing a family member if 
they have committed adultery or had non-
marital sex. 
57.75 34.13 59.5 59.31 
Abortion should be illegal. 51.96 35.60 50 52.25 
Authoritarian governments are more 
effective than democratic ones in times of 
difficulty. 
53.54 32.12 51 54.13 
Attacks on civilians are justifiable if they are 
in defence of Islam. 
61.01 34.34 66 63.27 
 
Table 2 - Dutch perceptions of MASV 
Question Mean SD Median Trimmed 
A woman must always obey her husband. 62.32 29.64 70 64.88 
Homosexuality is morally acceptable. 25.35 29.52 11 19.86 
People should be free to choose their religion 
and practice it freely. 
52.04 32.86 51 52.19 
One can justify killing a family member if 
they have committed adultery or had non-
marital sex. 
 
43.66 33.04 40 42.02 
Abortion should be illegal. 53.27 34.17 57.5 53.98 
Authoritarian governments are more 
effective than democratic ones in times of 
difficulty. 
46.4 30.58 50 45.63 
Attacks on civilians are justifiable if they are 
in defence of Islam. 
44.02 33.45 41 42.57 
 
  




Figure 1- Real MASV vs. Dutch and Hungarian perceptions 
NB: The figures used for both Hungarian and Dutch perceptions of MASV in Column graph 1 are obtained from 
the ‘trimmed’ column in tables 1 and 3. The trimmed readings take the mean score of a revised results set that 
ignores the lowest and highest 5% of the data, thus removing outliers.  
Mean difference between perceptions of MASV and Real MASV: 
• Hungary – 18.81 
• The Netherlands – 14.74 
Total perceptions of MASV extremity: 
• Hungary - 433.83  




















Figure 2- Relationship between attitudes to diversity and perceptions of MASV 
extremity 
Correlation: 
Hungary: (r=0.1169), The Netherlands: (r=0.2576). 
	  




Figure 3- Relationship between attitudes toward MAS settlement and perceptions of 
MASV extremity 
Correlation: 







Figure 4- Relationship between WTA and perceptions of MASV extremity 
Correlation: 
Netherlands r=0.31, Hungary r=0.19 
	  





Figure 5- Relationship between perceptions of MASV extremity on individual questions 
and attitudes towards letting more MAS settle in one's country 
NB: x-axis= ‘We should let more MAS settle in our country’ (1= strongly agree, 2= agree, 3= neither agree nor 
disagree, 4=disagree, 5=strongly disagree). Aborto= ‘Abortion should be illegal’, Homosex= ‘Homosexuality is 
morally acceptable.’ Religious Freedom= ‘People should be free to choose their religion and practice it freely,’ 
Women Obey= ‘A woman must always obey her husband,’ Honour Killings= ‘One can justify killing a family 
member if they have committed adultery or had not marital sex,’ Authoritarianism= ‘Authoritarian governments 
are more effective than democratic ones in times of difficulty,’ Religious Attacks= ‘Attacks on civilians are 















































































































Figure 11- Effect of education level on perceptions of MASV 
NB: Basic Education refers to completion of primary school only or primary school and secondary school. 
Discussion  
Figure 1 reveals the differences between Hungarian and Dutch perceptions of MASV 
and mean MASV scores across all seven topics of the BPV. Hungarian perceptions of 
MASV were less accurate than Dutch perceptions across all topics except on the 
question of whether a woman should obey her husband or not. The mean difference 
between their respective perceptions and the real MASV for each topic was 18.81 for 
Hungary and 14.74 for The Netherlands. Dutch participants tended to underestimate 
the extremity of MASV (four out of the seven questions), whereas Hungarians opted 
for a largely negative view of MASV, overestimating their extremity on five out of the 
seven topics. Moreover, Hungarians perceived MASV to be more extreme than Dutch 
people on five out of the seven topics, with homosexuality and abortion being the 
exceptions. In figure 2, one observes the correlation between negative attitudes 
towards diversity and increased perceptions of MAS extremity in the Netherlands 
(r=0.2576). Here it appears that when Dutch people perceive Total MASV extremity to 
be above 350, they also harbour negative views towards diversity. In the Hungarian 
case however there is a lower correlation (r=0.1169), which suggests that a Hungarian’s 
attitudes toward diversity (ATD) has less of an impact upon their perceptions of MASV 
extremity. In figure 3 there appears to be a correlation in both Dutch and Hungarian 
views on letting more MAS settle (LMS) in their home country and perceptions of 
MASV extremity (Hungary r=0.305, The Netherlands r=0.287). Similarly, one 
observes a strong correlation between MASV extremity and the perceived willingness 
of MAS to assimilate with national customs and traditions (WTA) in both countries 
(figure 4). All comparisons here attempted to demonstrate the consequences that 
perceptions of MASV can have on other issues important to immigration policy and to 
see whether useful predictors of MASV perceptions can be identified. It appears as 
though ATD, LMS and the WTA were all affected by one’s perception of MASV 
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perceptions of MASV extremity. Conversely, these three variables could also be good 
predictors of perceptions of MASV extremity in other EU countries. The results for 
these graphs however, don’t explain the reasons behind the elevated perceptions of 
MASV extremity among the Hungarian population vis-à-vis The Netherlands.   
In an attempt to discover what these causal factors might have been, an analysis of 
both countries’ perceptions of each separate issue in the BPV was conducted. Figure 5 
shows the effect that each of these issues has on LMS, which I regarded as the variable 
most likely to reflect immigration policy preferences in the ERC context. The relatively 
flat lines that one observes in religious freedom, homosexuality, abortion and 
authoritarianism indicate that one’s perception of MASV regarding these topics is 
relatively insignificant in influencing their views on MAS settlement. Conversely, the 
steep incline visible in both the honour killings and religious attacks issues indicates 
that these are key determinants of views on whether governments should allow more 
MAS to settle. Moreover, there is a difference of roughly 50 points in Hungarian 
perceptions of MAS support for religious attacks and honour killings between those 
who strongly agree that more MAS should be able to settle in Hungary and those that 
strongly disagree with the statement. This difference is significantly less in the Dutch 
case, indicating that fears of violence and terrorism play a smaller role in determining 
their views on MAS settlement. Finally, the fact that perceptions about homosexuality 
and women having to obey their husbands were the only two variables that generated 
a wider difference of views about MAS settlement among Dutch people compared to 
Hungarians suggests something interesting. Despite the incline not being as steep in 
either graph as it is in the two violence topics, it indicates that Dutch people are 
perhaps more concerned about the social value incompatibilities with MAS than 
Hungarians, whereas Hungarians appear to be considerably more concerned about 
MAS violence and terrorism than the Dutch.  
Two thirds of Dutch people who believe their government should stop allowing MAS 
to settle in their country consider the value incompatibility aspect to be the main 
reason behind that decision (figure 7). This differs from the views of the same group of 
Hungarians, who are evenly divided in their reasoning between value incompatibility 
and the threat of violence and terrorism (figure 6). However, considering that 
Hungarians regarded the greatest value discrepancy of the BPV to exist in both killing 
related questions (figure 1), it is reasonable to assume that those Hungarians who view 
violence and terrorism as the main threat of MAS would also consider the value 
incompatibility to be a major reason behind denying MAS settlement in Hungary and 
vice versa. These findings appear to be consistent with the literature, where I found 
more evidence to suggest that perceived cultural fears would be better predictors of 
anti immigration sentiments than perceived economic fears.  
Finally, figure 10 indicates that my assessment of the literature was accurate in 
regarding economic fears of immigration as insignificant. LMCT and FBT held that 
those with lower incomes would exhibit higher levels of resentment toward MAS given 
the latter would represent a threat to a native citizen’s access to scare resources. The 
results presented in figure 10 suggest that income levels are poor predictors of MASV 
perceptions. The only interesting finding from this graph is that Hungarian males 
appear to excessively overestimate MASV vis-à-vis all other participants. Additionally, 
results from both countries do not appear to validate my hypothesis that the 







This study aimed to assess the significance of European perceptions of MASV in 
national immigration regimes. The literature had indicated that there was more reason 
to believe that fears of identity loss and value incompatibility were better predictors of 
immigration preferences than economic factors. Given the media salience of MAS in 
recent times and the ability of right-wing populists to construct sensational narratives 
that exploit culture-based fears, I decided to measure just how greatly this combination 
had falsified European views of MASV. Although policies adopted by both Dutch and 
Hungarian governments in this field weren’t analysed, the study discovered a 
correlation between three variables significant to immigration preferences and 
perceptions of MASV extremity. Thus, it appears that European perceptions of MASV 
are good predictors of national immigration policies.  
The second objective of this study was to measure the inaccuracy of these perceptions. 
Both Hungary and the Netherlands held largely inaccurate perceptions of MASV. 
Whereas Dutch people tended to underestimate the extremity of MASV, Hungarians 
overestimated their extremity. The former’s imprecise account could be problematic in 
Dutch society’s stance on gender equality with their perceptions of MAS acceptance of 
homosexuality and female obedience far from actual MASV on these issues. On the 
other hand, Hungarians overestimated MASV regarding honour killings, religious 
attacks and authoritarian governance preferences by a considerable margin. This could 
be interpreted as a sign that Hungarians believe MAS bring violence and terrorism.  
Finally, the study wasn’t able to identify potential causes of these inaccuracies with 
both income levels and education failing to display any relationship with perceptions 
of MASV. However, given my first hypothesis appeared to confirm the literature’s 
concerns with identity exclusionism and the interaction between right wing populism 
and media organisations, it would be worthwhile to investigate the precise relationship 
between the media’s portrayal of MAS and perceptions of MASV across several EU 
countries. Additionally, more research should be undertaken that analyses the 
influence of national education systems on the formation of perceptions of MASV.   
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